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 Rethinking clientelism: Politics of
service delivery in rural India
Clientelism is often blamed for public service
delivery failures in developing countries.
While the top-down drivers of political support
in exchange for service delivery for speciﬁc
constituents is well-documented, local
grassroots inﬂuence and the effect of
democratic mobilisation by local communities
are less well-understood. This blog looks at
the value of combining top-down inﬂuence
with bottom-up community mobilsation to
exert stronger pressures on improving anti-
poverty programme outcomes.
Why in developing countries do some communities receive
better access than others to government anti-poverty
programmes that are ostensibly rule-based? For decades, the
dominant framework for understanding this puzzle has been the
literature on ‘clientelism’, which suggests that politicians
manipulate public funds in order to cultivate political support.
But are citizens simply passive recipients of funds distributed
from above? The findings of my research suggest not. The
communities that are best served by government are those that
possess both top-down political connections to the ruling party,
as well as high levels of grassroots local democratic
mobilisation needed to place pressure on local politicians to
deliver services.
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Picking winners: A top-down story
To study this puzzle, I examined how the performance of
India’s largest rural anti-poverty programme, the National
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India’s largest rural anti-poverty programme, the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act, varied across villages in
Rajasthan – a poor, arid state in Western India where demand
for the programme is particularly intense. Constituencies that
were narrowly won or lost in the most recent state elections
were compared through a survey of 2,250 households. In
constituencies with close elections, results revealed that electing
a ruling-party legislator significantly improved employment
opportunities and wages received by local households under
NREGA – even though households in opposition-party
constituencies were similar in terms of objective levels of
demand for the programme. The gap was large enough to
represent a roughly 0.83% increase in average household
income, suggesting that political connections to the ruling party
play an important role in shaping the livelihoods of ordinary
citizens.
…politicians should be provided with incentives to
exert effort in the delivery of public services across
constituencies on a broad basis. ”
Looking at intermediate outcomes, the reason for this gap
appears to be that villages in ruling-party constituencies
received larger numbers of NREGA projects – which are
required to generate employment and wage payments under the
programme. So far, this is consistent with the literature on
clientelism, with ruling-party legislators utilising their political
influence to deliver additional public projects to their home
constituencies in order to cultivate political support.
Democratic mobilisation shapes service delivery
Looking within constituencies, however, the story becomes
more complicated. It turns out that not all villages benefited
equally from political connections to the ruling party. Instead,
the benefits of electing a ruling-party legislator were
overwhelmingly concentrated in “democratically mobilised”
villages – places where the local village council was
characterised by high levels of citizen participation and political
competition.
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To measure local democratic mobilisation, I averaged citizens’
own reports of levels of participation and competition in the
local village council. Not only does there exist substantial
variation across villages in the reported extent of local
democratic mobilisation, but this variation plays a crucial role
in shaping service delivery.
Why did ruling-party legislators target resources at
democratically mobilised villages? It seems to be the case that
democratically mobilised communities are better at placing
grassroots pressure on local politicians and translating political
connections into actual service delivery. This is also reflected in
the content of village council meeting discussions. In
democratically mobilised communities, a much larger share of
households report discussions of substantive issues related to
the performance of government programmes.
Combining top-down and bottom-up: A better outcome for
development
The findings suggest that access to government services is a
function of political connections, as the clientelism literature
suggests, together with the internal democratic organisation of
local communities, something that has not received enough
attention. These findings suggest some novel combination of a
top-down approach, as well as bottom-up institutional
strategies are needed to strengthen service provision in
developing countries in a manner that is consistent with
democratic principles, and more likely to improve government
programme performance
The implication of this research is certainly not that
programmes should be shielded from political influence – that is
a “fool’s errand”. Instead, politicians should be provided with
incentives to exert effort in the delivery of public services across
constituencies on a broad basis. One counter-intuitive way to
achieve this would be to institutionalise the role of locally
elected legislators in the administrative process of allocating
projects and benefits under large-scale anti-poverty
programmes. This would a) provide opposition party legislators
with greater influence, thus mitigating the exclusion of
politically unaligned constituencies from access to programmes,
and b) provide legislators with opportunities to claim credit for
constituency service, thus linking electoral incentives to public
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service delivery.
Additionally, strengthening local democracy can encourage
candidates from marginalised communities to contest local
elections, encourage community attendance and participation at
village meetings, and  preserve the rule of law and minimise
violence and vote buying in local elections – all promising
avenues through which to improve the performance of anti-
poverty programmes on a “bottom-up” basis.
Twinning these two approaches could significantly strengthen
the on-the-ground performance of anti-poverty programmes in
developing countries.
 
